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ABSTRACT
Employing a discursive institutionalist approach in the form of the critical juncture theory
(CJT), this paper examines the nature of the changes to Irish industrial policy in the mid
1980s, a time when the country went through one of its worst economic crises. Did these
policy changes, ushered in by the Telesis Report of 1982, constitute a transformation in
industrial policy, or a continuation of a previously established policy pathway, and if so why?
To answer this question the paper explores the roles played by various change agents, and
their ideas, in altering the industrial policy that had been established during the 1950s, when
the country first opened up to foreign trade and investment. The findings ultimately help
explain why Irish industrial policy did not undergo a radical transformation during the 1980s.
Keywords: Crisis; critical juncture; ideas; industrial; policy.
INTRODUCTION
In the current context of economic crisis we examine how earlier Irish governments, also
confronted with challenging economic circumstances, sought to alter the country’s industrial
policy. During the second half of the 1970s the Irish economy performed relatively well,
after weaker performance following the first oil shock. However, recovery proved transitory,
as pro cyclical fiscal policies fed inflation. By the 1980s, the economy shrank,
unemployment and emigration returned. This led to a questioning of industrial policy in
place since the 1950s. What changes were made to this policy during the 1980s? And what
lessons might this hold for contemporary policy makers? We use CJT to investigate these
questions.
According to Hogan (2006) a critical juncture is a multi stage event. A crisis can
create a situation where extant policiesand associated ideas are called into question. Any
subsequent displacement of the extant paradigm by a new set of ideas on how policy should
operate can lead to radical policy change. Without ideational change, policy change will
likely be only relatively minor. The hierarchy of goals underpinning a policy will remain
unaltered. In lieu of alternatives, extant policy soldiers on. CJT seeks to pinpoint key ideas
and actors involved in the process of policy change.
THE LITERATURE ON POLICY CHANGE

Fully comprehending policy change would require knowledge of the objectives of hundreds
of actors from across a jurisdiction, involve highly technical issues and span many years
(Sabatier, 2007). Such complexity means that policy change has been examined using a
range of theoretical frameworks.
The incremental policy change literature recognizes the subtleties of gradual change
during periods of stability and continuity during upheavals. Incremental policy change can
be transformative over a long time (Thelen, 2004: 292).
The policy streams approach incorporates a role for policy entrepreneurs in policy
change (Kingdon, 1995). When a window of opportunity forms, due to a shock, policy
entrepreneurs attempt to gain government support for the solutions they put forward by
linking problems, ideas and politics (Mintrom & Norman, 2009). There are a variety of
solutions, in the form of ideas - as per the garbage can model (Cohen, March and Olsen,
1972).
Sabatier’s (1988) and Jenkins-Smith’s (1990) Advocacy Coalition framework (ACF),
contributes to the policy process literature through taking:
Longer term time perspectives to understand policy change; a need for a more
complex view of subsystems to include both researchers and intergovernmental
relations; a need for more attention to the role of science and policy analysis in
public policy; and a need for a more realistic model of the individual rooted
more deeply in psychology rather than microeconomics. (Weible et al., 2011:
349)
An advocacy coalition consists of ‘elected and agency officials, interest group leaders, and
researchers who share a particular belief system’ (Sabatier, 1988: 139), forming an alliance to
obtain greater influence in the policy-making process (Nohrstedt & Weible, 2010: 16). This
approach shows how groups can lead to the development of new ideas for policy change
(Jones & Jenkins-Smith, 2009).
Similarly the Epistemic Communities Framework (ECF) focuses on networks with
expertise, who share knowledge, as they seek policy change (Haas, 2004). According to ECF,
a proliferation of new ideas on policy change may be triggered by uncertainty over a problem
(Meijerink, 2005: 1063). Both ACF and ECF examine the role of networks, ideas,
information and learning processes in policy change (Haas, 2004).
In contrast to the ACF and ECF, Baumgartner and Jones (1993) see policy change is
characterized by periods of stability broken by instances of radical transformation –
punctuated equilibrium. Policy stasis results from the inability of policy makers to manage
more than a limited number of issues simultaneously, or from the capacity of supporters of
extant policy to reduce the pressure for policy change (True et al. 2007). Significant policy
changes may occur when opponents of extant policy create new perceptions of the issue at
stake and gain support for their new ideas at a higher administrative level (Hogan and Feeney
2012). Once the new policy becomes accepted amongst policy entrepreneurs and the political
elite a new policy monopoly, and stasis, is instituted (Meijernik 2005).
Hogan and Doyle (2007), building on ideas of punctuated equilibrium, claim that a
critical juncture consists of a crisis, ideational change (extant ideational collapse, new
ideational consolidation) and a radical policy change. They argue that outside influencers
(public, media, NGOs etc), policy entrepreneurs (civil servants, technocrats, academics,
economists,interest groups) and political entrepreneurs (elected politicians) act, in the words
of Kleistra and Mayer (2001), as either carriers or barriers to policy change. Here ideas can
be seen to be about what is, and what ought to be (Mehta. 2010). Discursive interaction
(exchange of ideas) between these policy elites and the general public, moving in multiple

directions, generates the alternative ideas that lead to collective action (Schmidt, 2008).; as
well as constituting an effort on our part to ‘endogenize’ policy change (Schmidt, 2010) –
making the exogenous shock less significant vis-à-vis ideational change. Should a broad
consensus develop that the paradigm underpinning extant policy is inadequate then ideational
collapse occurs. But, sometimes society, failing to reach consensus on a replacement idea,
re-embraces the failing idea (Legro, 2000). The theory presents the notion that, even in the
wake of a crisis, policy failure and ideational collapse, there is no guarantee new ideas will
become policy. However, if the actors seeking policy change reach agreement on a
replacement paradigm, and gain support at a high administrative level, significant policy
change may follow. In this environment, political entrepreneurs can act as the bridge
between coalitions advocating new policy ideas and the institutions implementing them
(Donnelly and Hogan 2012).
CJT uses ideas in a form of “discursive institutionalism” to overcome the limitations
in “traditional” new institutionalist approaches in explaining policy change – their static and
overly determinist nature (Schmidt, 2008; 2010). In this instance, discursive institutions are
not rule following structures of the older institutionalisms that serve as restraints on actors,
but are internal to agents as constraining structures and enabling constructs of meaning
(Schmidt, 2010).
CASE STUDY: TESTING FOR A CRITICAL JUNCTURE IN IRISH INDUSTRIAL
POLICY IN THE 1980s
From the 1950s onwards, Irish industrial policy moved away from protectionism, seeking to
attract foreign direct investment (FDI) as a stimulus for growth and skills transfer (Girvin,
1994: 125). This strategy was adopted in a climate of severe recession, emigration and a
precipitously falling population. Thus, dire economic performance prompted a fundamental
reappraisal of policy in the 1950s.
Throughout the 1980s Ireland again experienced severe difficulties. In an
environment of economic stagnation, there was concern that emigration would again
depopulate the country, denuding it of its educated young people (O’Rourke & Hogan, 2013).
Thus, once more Irish society, and its policy makers, experienced great uncertainty. Would
the the state continue to rely on FDI as its engine for growth or would there be a radical
policy change once more?
THE CRITICAL JUNCTURE THEORY
Critical junctures result in the adoption of a particular arrangement from among alternatives.
Thereafter, the pathway established funnels units in that direction (Mahoney 2003: 53). For
some, a critical juncture constitutes an extended period of reorientation (Collier and Collier,
1991; Mahoney 2003), while for others, it is a brief period in which one direction, or another,
is taken (Garrett and Lange, 1995; Hogan; 2006). Recently, Flockhart (2005) used critical
junctures to explain the gap between Danish voters and their politician’s attitudes towards the
European Union (EU), while Wolff (2012) examined the development of an EU counterterrorism policy through critical junctures. However, the literature is inconsistent in how it
differentiates critical junctures from other forms of policy change - such as incremental
change. Hogan (2006) sought to resolve this by setting out a revised critical juncture theory
and developing a framework capable of testing for critical junctures and producing consistent
findings.
The literature on critical junctures often examines them from the perspective of crises,
emphasizing the tensions that precede critical junctures, as per historical institutionalism.

However, according to Hogan and Doyle (2007), a critical juncture consists of discreet, but
interconnected elements: crisis, ideational change and radical policy change – the ideational
element moving the theory into the realm of discursive institutionalism. But, how ideas
influence policy is complex, rising questions such as: Where do ideas come from? How do
they relate to failing policies? And, why does the paradigm underlying a failing policy
sometimes change, resulting in policy change, whereas at other times it remains unaltered?
To understand the social world "necessitates a deep and systematic engagement with ideas,
because without them, neither stability nor change in social systems can be fully understood"
(Blyth, 2011: 84). Without discourse – understood as the exchange of ideas - it is difficult to
explain how ideas transform from individual thoughts into collective actions (Schmidt, 2010).
The theory’s third stage tests policy change using Hall’s (1993) three orders of policy change.
Testing each stage involves developing observable implications that can be evaluated
individually. The framework (discussed below) has been applied to a variety of policy areas:
change in macroeconomic policy, the rolling back of privatization policy and the study of
policy change in nondemocratic states (see Hogan, 2006; Hogan and Doyle, 2007; Hogan and
Cavatorta, 2013). This CJT helps provide insights into the key events, ideas and roles
performed by various actors in the policy change process.
Testing for a Crisis
A crisis implies extant policies are failing to address a problem (Boin, Hart, Stern, &
Sundelius, 2005) and as a result can unleash powerful forces for change that can have a long
lasting impact (Haggard 2003). Economic crises are more common in modern democracies
than wars or revolutions. Hogan and Doyle's (2007: 888) critical juncture theory, recognising
that identifying a macro-economic crisis is difficult, involving subjective and objective
deliberations, uses 12 encompassing observable implications that draw upon the currency
crisis, recession and policy reform work of Garuba (2006), Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh
(2003), Pei & Adesnik (2000:139) and Yu, Lai, & Wang, (2006: 439). These observables
identify changes in nominal economic performance and perceptions of economic health (See
Appendix A).
Testing for Ideational Change
Ideational change can result in a transformed policy environment, but understanding how
ideas influence policy is something theorists have long grappled with. The failure of extant
policies to resolve a crisis provides a window of opportunity for change agents to contest the
viability of the underlying paradigm (Kingdon, 1995). These agents can gain power for their
ideas by setting the agenda for reform in the policy sphere (Schmidt, 2010).
To address the question of why ideas underlying failing policies sometimes change,
resulting in policy change, whereas at other times they remain unaltered, Donnelly and
Hogan (2012), drawing on Legro (2000), argue that significant policy change depends upon a
broad range of change agents (outside influencers and policy entrepreneurs) perceiving the
extant paradigm as inadequate (collapse) and coalescing (consolidation) around a set of new
ideas, championed by a political entrepreneur. As Blyth (2002: 37) argues, ‘ideas facilitate
the reduction of … barriers by acting as coalition-building resources among agents who
attempt to resolve the crisis.’ Ideational change constitutes the intermediating factor between
a crisis and policy change. We have seven observable implications for identifying extant
ideational collapse and new ideational consolidation (See Appendix B).
However, ‘even when ideational collapse occurs, failure to reach consensus on a
replacement could still produce continuity, as society reflexively re-embraces the old

orthodoxy’ (Legro, 2000: 424). This is because in addition to policy viability, policy ideas
must have administrative and political viability (Hall, 1989).
Testing for Policy Change
The CJT's final stage employs Hall’s (1993) concepts of first, second and their order change
to develop observables implications to identify policy change (See Appendix C). The
observables incorporate Hogan's (2006) notions of swift and enduring change. As we are
dealing with a critical juncture (radical change), we assume this is not a long process;
otherwise, it would constitute incremental change. In an environment full of competing
policy entrepreneurs and ideas, such a policy change should survive a change of government
(Hogan and Doyle 2007). This addresses the problem in policy dynamics of defining and
operationalizing the scope and timing of policy change (Howlett, 2009). As Capano and
Howlett (2009) argue, when a policy is regarded as fundamental it is usually based on a
multi-year perspective. These observables enabled the differentiation of policy changes,
ranging from minor adjustments to the setting of policy instruments, to paradigm changes in
policy goals (Hall, 1993).
According to the theory, after a crisis, but in the absence of ideational change, policy
change may be of the first or second order, but not the third (paradigm shift). The presence
of ideational change will lead to third order policy change – which according to the
framework constitutes a critical juncture.
Evaluation of the Findings
To evaluate the evidence for a crisis, extant ideational collapse, new ideational consolidation
and the type of policy change, the finding for each observable implication was evaluated
independently by each author and assigned a score according to whether it indicated strong
(3), medium (2), weak (1) or no support (0). The stronger the inter-coder agreement
indicated between the authors’ findings, the greater the likelihood these are accurate. This
approach allows for a more nuanced understanding of policy change. As interpretation plays
a part in divining meaning from codes, the reporting of findings involves thick description of
categories and contexts (Polgar & Thomas, 2008: 248). We found inter-coder agreement to
be above 91 per cent; and Krippendorff’s alphas above 0.8, which Krippendorff (2004: 241)
deems reliable beyond chance (see Appendix).
IDENTIFICATION OF MACROECONOMIC CRISIS
The Irish economy in the 1980s
During the late 1970s the Irish economy performed relatively well, having recovered from the
effects of the 1974 oil crisis. The high levels of inflation and unemployment, that peaked in
the middle of the decade, had begun to fall, while growth returned (Leddin and Walsh, 1998:
26). We can see from Table 1 that real gross domestic product (GDP) increased by 4.5
percent on average between 1975 and 1979.
In 1977, a new Fianna Fáil government employed an expansionary fiscal policy at a
time when the economy was growing at an unsustainable rate (OECD, 1982: 10). This fiscal
injection, in pursuit of a “dash or growth” that economists warned was unsustainable, led to a
deterioration in fiscal balances, with the public sector-borrowing requirement increasing from
13 percent of GNP in 1976 to 20 percent in 1981 (FitzGerald, 2000: 43). This period saw
record deficits in the current external balance and the public sector accounts (OECD, 1983:
7). As we can see from Table 1, inflation peaked at 20.4 percent in 1981, while interest rates
remained high.

Table 1 – Ireland’s Main Economic Indicators, 1972–1991
Year

Unemployment
Inflation
%
%
1974
5.4
17.0
1975
7.3
20.9
1976
9.0
18.0
1977
8.8
13.6
1978
8.1
7.6
1979
7.1
13.2
1980
7.3
18.2
1981
9.9
20.4
1982
11.4
17.1
1983
13.6
10.5
1984
15.4
8.6
1985
16.7
5.4
1986
17.1
3.8
1987
17.7
3.1
1988
16.4
2.1
1989
15.1
4.1
Sources: European Commission (1997);
Mitchell (1992); United Nations (2013).

Interest
Government Debt Growth Rates in
Economic
%
to GNP ratio
Real GDP %
Openness1
12
55.39
4.2
94.37706
10
58.05
2.0
86.44022
14.8
62.5
2.1
94.96721
6.8
61.4
6.9
102.0045
11.9
63.5
6.7
103.7894
16.5
70.65
2.4
109.601
14.0
71.91
1.9
106.4831
16.5
77.45
1.1
105.0999
14.0
86.53
-0.7
97.81183
12.3
97.60
-1.6
101.7349
14
106.28
2.3
112.7388
10.3
108.60
0.8
112.172
13.3
123.26
-1.1
101.1026
9.3
124.07
4.6
104.8707
8.0
117.35
4.4
109.5299
12.0
106.84
7.0
117.0717
Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002); Leddin and Walsh (1998);

As the economy slowed, then began to shrink and unemployment and interest rates rose,
emigration increased (OECD 1982: 10). More people were unemployed by June 1981 than at
any time in the country’s history (The Irish Times, 1981a: 6). The balance of payments
deficit was 13 percent of GNP (Central Bank of Ireland, 1982: 16). The government’s
spending was so high that the total amount budgeted for 1981 had been consumed by midyear
. Consequently, almost half of exchequer borrowing for 1981 went to financing the current
budget deficit (Bacon et al., 1986: 6), which stood at an unsustainable 7.3 percent of GNP
(Leddin and O’Leary, 1995: 167).
The debt to GNP ratio was on an unbroken upward trajectory from 1977 to 1987,
surpassing 100 percent by 1984. Between 1979 and 1986 the rate of increase of debt to GNP
regularly exceeded 10 percent per annum. The fiscal deficit, intended in the late 1970s to be
temporary, became impossible to eliminate. Imports and exports fluctuated wildly, reflected
in figures for trade openness in Table 1. Only inflation improved after 1981. By 1986, the
economy had been in continuous stagnation since 1980, contracting for the third time in five
years (see Table 1). An Irish Independent poll found that a majority of citizens were
skeptical of the politicians’ ability to run the country properly (O’Regan, 1981: 1).
The need to control public expenditure and prevent excessive reliance on foreign
borrowing dictated the adoption of tighter fiscal policies. However, the catch-all nature of
Irish political parties induced governments to buy off short-term pressure from interest
groups through ad hoc policy concessions. This worked against the imposition of severe
economic policies and the formulation of enduring agreements between the state and
economic interest groups, like those in Continental neo-corporatism.
By the mid 1980s there was unanimity in the domestic and foreign media concerning
the economy. Finlan (1987: 16) writing in The Irish Times, described the economy as being
“on the ropes” . The Economist pointed out that by 1987 ‘the people of Ireland were deeply in
debt to the outside world, three times as much per head as Mexico’ (The Economist, 1987:
53). The Irish Times (1987a: 10) noted that some economic commentators were advocating
1

Measured by the trade to GDP ratio. This is acquired by adding the value of imports and exports and dividing
by GDP.

debt repudiation due to the scale of indebtedness. Overall, the general consensus in the
newspapers was one of stagnation and crisis.
Most economists were critical of economic policy and performance during the 1980s
(Bradley and FitzGerald, 1989: iii). While initially boosting the economy, the government's
debt-finance plan for rapid development between 1977 and 1980 was a disaster, due to the
depression and debt-burden that followed (O'Rourke, 2010). Bacon et al. (1986: 1) observed
that ‘the first half of the decade of the 1980s, taken as a whole, was a period of appalling
economic performance.’ 'It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Irish economic
performance has been the least impressive in Western Europe, perhaps in all Europe'
(Kennedy and Conniffe, 1986: 288). The Central Bank (1987: 7) foresaw no immediate
prospects for an improvement in growth or employment. More worryingly, it argued that the
situation did not permit for increases in welfare benefits to the disadvantaged. An increasing
level of poverty was eroding the lives of a growing segment of society (O'Morain, 1987: 7).
As the OECD (1987: 77) put it: ‘by the mid-1980s a number of acute imbalances confronted
the Irish economy.’ These imbalances were also making the business community worried.
The Small Firms Association noted steadily declining business confidence (The Irish Times,
1987b: 6). Leading businessman Tony O’Reilly warned of the dangers of International
Monetary Fund (IMF) involvement in running the countryif the crisis was not resolved
(Keenan, 1987: 8).
After 1982 all the major parties agreed on the need to stabilise the debt/GNP ratio
(Mjøset, 1992: 381). The state changed its overall policy from focusing on employment to
balancing budgets, export growth, and international competitiveness. A member of Fine
Gael, Alexis Fitzgerald, remarked that in just 4 years Fianna Fáil had doubled the national
debt it had taken 57 years to accumulate (The Irish Times, 1981a: 6). Subsequently, Prime
Minister Garrett FitzGerald acknowledged that the national debt and interest payments, rising
faster than national income, constituted a vicious circle, each year consuming a larger share
of taxation (The Irish Times, 1987c: 10). Opposition leader, Charles Haughey, remarked that
‘the economy is at a total stand-still’ (Cooney, 1987a: 9). Amongst the public consensus held
that the country was in the midst of a serious financial crisis (Cooney, 1987b: 1). ‘By 1987
the Irish economy was universally seen to have reached nadir’ (The Economist, 1992: 6).
Table 2 – Identification of Macroeconomic Crisis in Ireland in the 1980s
Identification of Macroeconomic Crisis
Coder 1
O1.
O2.
O3.
O4.
O5.
O6.
O7.
O8.
O9.
O10.
O11.
O12.

Stagnant or negative GDP growth
Unemployment above 10 percent
Inflation and interest rates above 10 percent
National debt, as a percentage of GDP, increasing at more
than 10 percent, annually
The level of economic openness declining
Public perceives economic crisis
Media perceive economic crisis
Economic/political commentators perceive economic crisis
Central bank perceives economic crisis
OECD perceives economic crisis
Elected representatives perceive economic crisis
Government pronouncements consistent with crisis
management approach

Coder 2

3
3
3
3

3
3
3
3

3
2
3
3
3
3
3
3

2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3

Strong

Strong

(3) strong support | (2) medium support | (1) weak support | (0) no support | (N/A) not available

From Table 2, we see that both authors felt the majority of observable implications support
the argument that Ireland, during the 1980s, experienced an economic crisis. The next
sections test for ideational change in industrial policy during this crisis and the nature of the
policy change that followed.
IDENTIFICATION OF IDEATIONAL AND POLICY CHANGE
The Ideas Underlying Industrial Policy
The Ideas Underlying Industrial Policy
After opening its economy in the 1950s, Ireland sought to attract labour intensive industries
based around technically mature products (Lee, 1992). In the context of the weakness of
indigenous industry, this seemed a realistic alternative capable of delivering industrial
development (Lee, 1992). By the beginning of the 1970s FDI accounted for the majority of
new manufacturing jobs and exports. However, this approach led to the sidelining of
indigenous industry in the policy process (Girvin 1989). It also failed to create high value
jobs and the foreign companies were footloose (O’Malley, 1985). In response, the Industrial
Development Authority (IDA) started to look at attracting more sophisticated overseas
producers in pharmaceuticals and electronics (Wrigley, 1985). However, the economic
problems of the 1970s led to a questioning of industrial policy by society, the media and
policy entrepreneurs.
The Cooper-Whelan Report
The 1973 Cooper-Whelan report, co-authored by Noel Whelan, a civil servant, who later
became Secretary of the Department of the Taoiseach, was sceptical of the long term benefits
of FDI, as opposed to indigenous enterprise (Lee, 1992). , This report questioned the weak
links between FDI and indigenous industry. By 1979, it was clear that the success of the FDI
sector was not finding its way into the rest of the economy (Lee, 1992).
This situation, impelled the National Economic and Social Council (NESC), then
under Whelan's chairmanship, to commission an examination of Ireland’s industrial
programme(Brunt, 1988: 32). The objective was “to ensure that the Irish government’s
industrial policy is appropriate to the creation of an internationally competitive industrial base
in Ireland which will support increased employment and higher living standards” (Telesis,
1982: 3). This examination encompassed a number of reports, the most important of which
was Telesis's (1982) examination of industrial policy..

The Telesis Report
A Review of Industrial Policy, referred to as the Telesis Report, after praising the clarity and
consistency of industrial policy, highlighted the problems of FDI, its impact on job creation
and failure to create linkages with indigenous industry (Telesis, 1982). Pointing out that
sustained economic development and a high incomes economy relies on native
entrepreneurship, the report queried the policy emphasis on foreign investment (Lee, 1992,
531) and a culture of dependence on state aid (Sweeny, 1998: 103). It argued that the IDA
had not been as successful in attracting FDI as it suggested (Telesis, 1982). Of jobs approved
between 1972 and 1978 “only 20 percent were in place at the end of the period” (Coogan,
1987: 6). The report encouraged a shift “towards building strong indigenous companies in
the export and sub-supply business sector” (Sweeny, 1998: 127) and that the proportion of
funds given to domestic industries (one third of all funding available) be doubled by the end
of the decade (Telesis, 1982). The Telesis report "sent shock waves through the policy

establishment" (Lee, 1992: 532).
intellectual coherence.

This questioning of industrial policy challenged its

Reaction to Telesis – Ideational Collapse
In light of the criticisms of the IDA in Telesis, it disputed the findings of the report (O’Brien,
1982: 1). The IDA had become “the centre of policy-making, a point strongly criticised by
Telesis” (Sweeney, 1998: 127). “The development effort aimed towards new indigenous
industry must be reorganised to emphasise the building of structurally strong Irish companies
rather than strong agencies to assist weak companies” (Telesis, 1982: 33). Tánaiste, Dick
Spring, admitted that Telesis pointed to failings in the overall industrial policy framework
(Dáil Debates 342, cols. 861, 11 May 1983).
There was ideational collapse as Whelan, the NESC, Telesis and a host of economists,
constituting policy entrepreneurs, critiqued the orthodoxy underlying extant industrial policy,
while other changes agents in the media and trade unions supported the ideas proposed by
Telesis. However, there was no clear political entrepreneur for these policy entrepreneurs to
rally around. This was partly down to the fact that Ireland, at the time, experienced a period
of weak and unstable governments as the economic crisis gripping the country deepened (The
Irish Times, 1981b: 12).
Table 3 – Indication of Ideational Collapse
Coder 1

Coder2

2
1

3
1

3

2

3
2
2

2
1
2

Strong

Medium

Indication of Extant Ideational Collapse

O13. Media questioning efficacy of current model
O14. Opposition critiques current model and propose alternative
ideas
O15. Policy entrepreneurs critique current model and propose
alternatives
O16. Civil society organizations critique current model
O17. Widespread public dissatisfaction with current paradigm
O18. External/international organizations critique current model
and actively disseminate alternatives
Extant Ideational Collapse
Changes in Industrial Policy

Political Instability – Policy Drift
Telesis found that extant industrial policy “did not go far enough in developing native skills
in technology and marketing, the key elements of self-sustaining growth. The foundations of
the industrial superstructure therefore lacked depth” (Kennedy, 1986: 49). The scale of the
policy changes required by Telesis would take time to both implement and take effect
(Kennedy, 1983: 34). The ESRI, predicting the economic crisis would worsen, insisted that
the necessary policy changes could not be delayed (O’Brien, 1983: 12).
[However] the period from December 1979 to December 1982 was one of
the most remarkable periods in modern Irish history. There were four
changes of Taoiseach in that period, six Ministers for Finance, three changes
of government and the Irish economy declined progressively to a level
unprecedented for decades. (Browne, 1983: 5)

Apart from crisis-induced cutbacks, no coherent ideas/policies emerged, as the governments
were of such unstable character. ‘Not only economically, but also politically, instability
peaked in 1981-1982’ (Mjøset, 1992: 381).
By November 1982, when the majority Fine Gael-Labour Coalition came to power,
with the national debt exceeding GNP and the current budget deficit out of control, a coherent
set of corrective policies was essential. The state of the public finances restricted the
government to austerity measures. . However, the Coalition experienced difficulty in
devising an effective strategy (O’Byrnes, 1986: 219). It is against this background that we
examine the government's response to Telesis.
The Political Response to Telesis
For Snoddy (1982), Telesis marks the ending of the phase of reliance on FDI and the
beginning on a new phase focused on indigenous industry. However, reality was more
complex. The Minister for Industry, John Bruton, insisted that it was critical not to lose sight
of the contribution of 800 foreign firms, employing 80,000 workers (Dáil Debates 342, col.
906, 11 May 1983). Although reports from the ESRI and NESC, acknowledged that the Irish
economy was in crisis and that change was required, the official response to Telesis was slow
in coming. the
The government official response in the form of a White Paper (Government of
Ireland, 1984) came in the context of a severe economic crisis. For some the White Paper
“represented a pivotal document in the re-evaluation of the philosophy and strategic thrust of
industrial policy” (Boylan, 1996: 196). There were indeed “several changes in the content of
industrial policy” in response to Telesis (Kennedy, 1995: 59). It was acknowledged that
"Industrial policies which had clearly served Ireland well in the 1960s and 1970s are now
having less success" (Government of Ireland, 1984: 3) and recognized that economic
“flexibility, creativity and growth were all being thwarted by the dependence on foreign
investment” (Munck, 1993: 158). Yet, in concert with Telesis (1982), the White Paper stated
that there would be no radical change to incentives for FDI - "consistency and stability over
many years of our policies for industrial development have been a major source of strength"
(Government of Ireland, 1984: 7). There was a radical change in that employment creation
was no longer the sole objective and attention should focus on the international
competiveness of the whole industrial sector (Brunt, 1988: 32). Wealth creation now took
precedence over job creation, as this permitted the development of the capacity to create jobs.
There was to be greater selectivity, the White Paper seeking to advance the process of
"picking winners", with the aim of developing domestic companies with export potential
(Jacobsen, 1994: 169), and a promotion of enterprise to strengthen indigenous (Carr, 2000).
The report also saw a shift away from manufacturing towards services.

Alterations to Industrial Policy
Under the coalition government, incentives were to be more selectively deployed, while
indigenous enterprises were given greater attention through the creation of a National
Development Corporation (NDC). The objective was to foster an increase in the number of
internationally traded companies, and to that end an export development scheme was set up.
There was some change in relation to FDI, with more of a focus on foreign companies with
R&D functions and the potential for linkages with domestic enterprises. The National
Planning Board s pointed to a lack of a manpower policy and argued that the appropriate
ministers, not the IDA, ought to direct policy (Jacobsen, 1994: 168).
1984 also saw the introduction of the Company Development Programme directed at
indigenous companies and designed to assist planning (Bielenberg and Ryan, 2013: 29).

Policy change could be seen in the National Linkage Programme in 1985, to achieve a more
integrated development pattern between indigenous and foreign enterprises (Brunt, 1988 p.
32). It would focus on upgrading local suppliers by improving their technical knowhow and
be selective in concentrating on companies “which had the potential to succeed” (Murdoch,
1985: 14). These approaches sought to achieve the new objectives of industrial policy: a
greater focus on indigenous enterprises; addressing weaknesses in management and
marketing; achieving better value for money and creating better linkages with FDI enterprises
(Kennedy, 1995). By 1985 the Irish Export Board (Córas Tráchtála (CTT)) was seeking to
address the information needs of exporters, as identified in the White Paper, through the
production of booklets entitled Guides for Exporting. Nevertheless, the IDA continued to
attract FDI, and in 1990, at unprecedented costs, secured a major investment from Intel
(Bielenberg and Ryan, 2013: 29).
"The Telesis report led to some measure of industrial policy reform, though this was
less interventionist than the report envisaged” (Bielenberg and Ryan, 2013: 29). Thus,
industrial policy gradually responded to the critiques of Telesis (1982) and the NESC (1982),
who criticized the failure of state support towards indigenous enterprises (O’Grada, 1997).
However, as Hall (1989: 11) points out, states tend to be predisposed towards those policies
with which they already have some favourable experience. Thus, to regard the policy
changes arising from Telesis, and the subsequent White Paper, as a break with extant
industrial policy would be incorrect. Rather, they constituted a form of, what Streeck and
Thelen (2005) refer to as, policy layering. These moves represent learning effects, an effort
to make extant policy work. Despite Telesis, grants to indigenous firms increased by only 3
percent between 1985 and 1989 (O’Hearn, 2001: 105). Industrial policy was adjusted in
1984, not transformed, due to a reluctance to break with past successes in attracting FDI.
The Nature of the Policy Change
Although the ideas underlying extant industrial policy might have collapsed in the wake of
the economic crisis, and provided a window of opportunity for radical policy change, this did
not occur. Whelan, the NESC and Telesis, along with many other economists and
commentators, acting as policy entrepreneurs, proposed alternative ideas to those underlying
industrial policy. However, in the absence of these change agents clustering around a
political entrepreneur to champion their alternative paradigm in the policy-making
environment, new ideational consolidation could not occur. Despite the growing recognition
that industrial policy was failing to produce the desired results, the Irish political
establishment was reluctant to abandon a policy prescription that had, at least during the
1960s and early 1970s, ended a century of depopulation and stagnation. No political
entrepreneur emerged during this period of ideational contestation. Politicians only seemed
interested in variations on the existing paradigm. In these circumstances, the ideas
underpinning extant industrial industrial policy endured. The collective mindset failed to
disengaged from a reliance on FDI and shift the focus of industrial policy to indigenous
enterprise.
Table 4 – Indication of: (i) New Ideational Consolidation; (ii) Level of Policy Change
Indication of New Ideational Consolidation
O19. Clear set of alternative ideas
3
O20. Political entrepreneur injecting new ideas into policy arena
0
O21. Political entrepreneur combines interests to produce
0
consensus around a replacement paradigm
New Ideational Consolidation
No

3
0
0
No

Indication of Level of Policy Change
O22. Policy instrument settings changed
O23. Instruments of policy changed
O24. Goals behind policy changed
Critical Juncture in Policy

3
1
0
No

3
2
0
No

(3) strong support | (2) medium support | (1) weak support | (0) no support | (N/A) not available

In Table 3, we see that during the 1980s the ideas underpinning industrial policy's focus on
FDI had collapsed. However, in the absence of a political entrepreneur willing to champion
alternative ideas, change agents failed to consolidate around a replacement orthodoxy. The
observables indicate there was no critical juncture in industrial policy in 1984, the policy
change being of the first order (Hall, 1993). We have an economic crisis, ideational collapse,
no new ideational consolidation and minor policy change.
Addendum: The Culliton Report 1991
“The attempt to follow these new directions of policy scarcely had time to prove themselves
before a new review of industrial policy was initiated in June 1991" (Kennedy, 1995: 60).
The Industrial Policy Review Group's focus, set out in the Culliton Report (named after its
chairman) was again on the indigenous sector (O’Grada, 1997: 119). The report called for a
reduction in grants and improving competiveness more generally, rather than picking winners
(Newman, 2011, 241).
The central message was that the policy for industrial development goes beyond
industrial policy as traditionally conceived (Kennedy, 1995). It advocated the breakup of the
IDA. The result was "the creation of three agencies, with IDA-Ireland specialising in
promoting foreign investment, Enterprise Ireland focusing on assisting indigenous enterprise,
and ForFás concentrating on policy advice" (White, 2001: p. 223).
The continued overdependence on foreign capital was a major concern, with this
report advocating the development of linkages between domestic and foreign firms (O’Hearn
2001: 105). This report's findings were similar to Telesis, despite the intervening decade.
Conclusion
According to theory, a critical juncture consists of crisis, ideational change and radical policy
change, with ideational change linking crisis and policy change. Following a crisis, policy
failure and extant ideational collapse, significant policy change depends upon actors, led by a
political entrepreneur, reaching consensus upon, and consolidating around, new ideas. It is in
the discursive interactions between the various actors that ideas are generated along with the
potential for radical policy change. As such, a discursive institutionalist approach is capable
of overcoming new institutionalism’s inability to explain change.
Employing a range of observable implications, we did not find a critical juncture in
industrial policy. Although the economy was in crisis, and undermining confidence in
prevailing industrial orthodoxy, neither of the main political parties was willing to challenge
the status quo. While ideational collapse occurred and alternatives were put forward, a
political entrepreneur willing to champion a new set of ideas on industrial policy failed to
emerge –extant orthodoxy endured.
In Ireland, since the 1950s, an outward orientated economic policy has remained
unaltered, due to recognition that a large number of jobs and a high percentage of FDI,
depend upon membership of the European Union (EU). The economic crisis of the 1980s did
not provoke a rethink of this overarching economic vision . However, policy entrepreneurs
questioned the focus of industrial policy. There was growing skepticism of the long term

benefits for the economy of a reliance on FDI and in particular its weak links with indigenous
industry. Following Telesis, industrial policy was changed to attract more sophisticated
foreign companies that would base R&D functions in Ireland and thereby create higher value
jobs; and to provide greater supports to indigenous industries which had previously been
sidelined.
Now, 30 years after the events discussed, Ireland has become a modern knowledge
based economy focusing on services and high-tech industries - many of which are foreign
multinationals. The intervening years have witnessed fiscal austerity, followed by the Celtic
Tiger and then more austerity following the banking collapse (O’Rourke & Hogan, 2014). .
The economy has also gone through widespread deregulation and privatization, all of which
impacted upon industrial policy, but without shifting its underlying paradigm. Thus, the
attraction of FDI is still crucial. Negotiations over the country’s recent IMF-EU bail-out saw
a key element of industrial policy, the 12.5 percent corporation tax rate, asserted as nonnegotiable in the face of Franco-German pressure. Foreign companies significant presence
can also been seen in the difference between Ireland's GNP and GDP figures. GNP, as a
percentage of GDP, has ranged from a high of 85.6 percent in the third quarter of 2007, to a
low of 79 percent in the first quarter of 2012 (CSO, 2013).
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Appendix A
O1. Stagnant or negative GDP growth (Pei & Adesnik, 2000).
O2. Unemployment above 10 percent (Pei & Adesnik, 2000).
O3. Inflation and interest rates above 10 percent (Pei & Adesnik, 2000).
O4. National debt, as a percentage of GNP, exceeds 100 percent and is increasing at more
than 10 percent, annually.
O5. The level of economic openness declining.
O6. Public perceives an economic crisis.
O7. National/international media perceive an economic crisis.
O8. Economic/political commentators perceive an economic crisis.
O9. Central bank perceives an economic crisis.
O10. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) perceives an
economic crisis.
O11. Elected representatives perceive an economic crisis.
O12. Government pronouncements on economy consistent with a crisis management
approach.
Appendix B
Indication of Extant Ideational Collapse
O13. Media question efficacy of the current model and/or specific policy areas.
O14. Opposition parties critique the current model and propose alternative ideas – at election
time their platform will be built around these alternatives.

O15. Civil servants, technocrats, academics, economists (policy entrepreneurs) critique the
current model and propose alternatives.
O16. Civil society organizations, e.g., labor unions, employer organizations, consumer
groups (policy entrepreneurs), critique the current model, reflecting Hall’s (1993)
coalition-centered approach.
O17. Widespread public dissatisfaction with the current paradigm, observable through
opinion polls, protests, etc.
O18. External/international organizations (policy entrepreneurs) critique the current model
and/or actively disseminate alternative ideas.
Indication of New Ideational Consolidation
O19. A clear set of alternative ideas, developed by policy entrepreneurs.
O20. A political entrepreneur injecting new ideas into the policy arena.
O21. The political entrepreneur combines interests, including policy entrepreneurs, to
produce consensus around a replacement paradigm.
Appendix C
Indication of Level of Policy Change
O22. Policy instrument settings changed (swiftly and for longer than one government’s term of
office)
O23. The instruments of policy changed (swiftly and for longer than one government’s term of
office)
O24. The goals behind policy changed (swiftly and for longer than one government’s term of
office)

